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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to study the interdependence of military spending  
between US and a panel of European countries in the period 1988-2013. The 
empirical estimation is based on a: (i) a unit root tests and a cointegration 
analysis; (ii) FMOLS  and DOLS estimations. General results highlight that 
military spending of European countries is: (1) positively associated with US 
military spending and (2) negatively associated with average military 
spending of other European countries.  
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The traditional model of demand for military expenditure developed in 
Smith (1980) presents military expenditure of a country as function of 
civilian output and of the ‘strategic environment’ which in turn is a function 
of military expenditures of other countries. In particular, the illustrative 
focus there was on the relationship between a superpower and other 
countries. Under the assumption that military expenditure of a superpower 
can be interpreted as a credible signal of threat, two behaviours could be 
envisioned: (i) free riding; (ii) leader/follower relationship. In the first case, 
the empirical association between military expenditures of a superpower 
and its allies turns to be negative because a country can ‘free-ride’ so 
reducing its contribution to the production of the public good of security. In 
the alternative case, a country is intended to ‘follow’ the leader so increasing 
the military expenditure. In fact, military expenditure of the superpower 
signals an increase in threat. The latter can be either allies or foes. 
Eventually, several papers confirmed the interdependence between the 
military spending of countries within an alliance at regional level [see 
among others Murdoch and Sandler (1984), Smith (1989), Sandler and 
Murdoch (1990)]. In this vein, this paper is intended first to verify whether 
the interdependence between US and European countries is confirmed in 
the period 1988-2013 when using a panel cointegration analysis. Then, by 
means of FMOLS and DOLS regressions, we provide long-run elasticities. In 
brief, we are able to verify whether European countries followed or free rode 
on US military spending. Secondly, we also consider interdependence among 
a panel of twenty European countries. 
 
The data set 
The empirical analysis exploits a panel of twenty European countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
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Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom. With the 
exception of Finland, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden all countries are 
members of NATO. The sample selection was driven by data availability. 
The panel includes 26 yearly observations from 1988 to 2013. The 
dependent variable is the level of military spending of country i in constant 
terms (MilExp). The main independent variables are: (i) the US military 
spending, namely USMilExp; (iii) the average military spending of other 
European countries considered, namely EUMilExp. According to the latter, 
when considering a country i, we compute EUMilExp as the average 
military spending of included European countries other than i. All the 
variables are expressed in constant prices (US dollars 2005) and logged. The 
data on Military Expenditure are drawn from the World Bank. Descriptive 
statistics of variables are in table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 - Descriptive statistics of main variables . 
 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
MilExp 520 27.095 26.953 1.361 23.319 29.467 
EUMilExp 520 27.206 27.220 0.166 26.768 27.447 
USMilExp 520 31.400 31.387 0.230 31.096 31.781 
 
The empirical strategy and results 
The empirical strategy is based on three steps: i) a panel unit root test on 
the variables; ii) a panel cointegration test; iii) FMOLS and DOLS 
estimations to capture the long-run relationships. Table 2 shows individual 
and common panel unit root test results based on Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 
2000), Breitung and Meyer (BM, 1994), and Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 
2003). 
TABLE 2. Panel Unit Roots Test 
 
No intercept and 
trend 
Intercept Intercept and trend 
  Statistic Statistic Statistic 
LLC       
MilExp -1.667** -4.403*** -2.305** 
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EUMilExp 23.174 -8.030*** 7.717 
USMilExp 0.979 -0.796 -3.414*** 
Δ MilExp -22.247*** -19.489*** -16.801*** 
Δ EUMilExp -10.724*** -14.418*** -13.386*** 
Δ USMilExp -10.633*** -3.361*** -1.002 
IPS       
MilExp   -3.485*** -2.375*** 
EUMilExp   -1.836** 9.147 
USMilExp   1.526 -0.465 
Δ MilExp   -19.121*** -16.134*** 
Δ EUMilExp   -10.643*** -9.157*** 
Δ USMilExp   -4.210*** -0.501 
BM       
MilExp     -4.388*** 
EUMilExp     6.752 
USMilExp     1.929 
Δ MilExp     -8.390*** 
Δ EUMilExp     -14.067*** 
Δ USMilExp     -2.281** 
Automatic selection of maximum lags based on Schwarz Info Criterion. Newey-West automatic 
bandwith selection and Bartlett kernel. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 
and 10 percent level of significance. 
 
Results suggest that we can rarely reject the hypothesis of common and 
individual unit roots when the variables are in (logged) levels, while the 
hypothesis of stationarity holds for their first difference in nearly every 
case. The series are non-stationary in levels and stationary in first 
differences if no linear trend is modelled. In that case time series show a 
pure stochastic trend with individual intercept. Once tested that the 
variables are integrated of order one - I(1) - we eventually test the 
hypothesis of the presence of cointegrating relationships among the series. 
We conduct the Pedroni (1999) and the Kao (1999) residual cointegration 
tests assuming no deterministic time trend. The first rejects the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration (at 90%) for all out of 11 statistics reported in 
the case of pure stochastic trend and individual intercepts (10 out of 11 at 
95%). On the contrary, the hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected in 
all out of 11 tests, when no individual intercept and trend is modelled. 
According to the first trend specification, the Kao test suggests that 
cointegrated relationships exist among variables and a long run relationship 




TABLE 3. PANEL COINTEGRATION TEST. 
Variables: MilExp, EUMilExp, USMilExp 
Sample 1988-2013. Observations: 520 - Cross-sections included: 20. Trend assumption: no 
linear trend. Null Hypothesis: no cointegration 
Pedroni 
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
 Intercept No intercept and trend  
v-Stat -2.696*** -2.141 
rho-Stat -1.627* 2.114 
PP-Stat -2.939*** 1.369 
ADF-Stat -3.397*** 1.413 
 Weighted stat Stat 
v-Stat 2.072** -2.919 
rho-Stat -4.223*** 2.566 
PP-Stat -6.262*** 2.232 
ADF-Stat -3.974*** 2.447 
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coeffs. (between-dimension) 
 Stat Stat 
rho-Stat -1.978** 3.933 
PP-Stat -5.471*** 3.374 
ADF-Stat -6.566*** 3.241 
Kao 
 t-Stat  
ADF -3.570***  
Automatic lag length selection based on Schwarz Info Criterion with a max lag of 5 - 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel.  
 
The hypothesis of cointegrated relationships suggests us to estimate long 
period relationships between the variables by means of group-mean panel 
fully modified (FMOLS) and panel dynamic (DOLS) techniques as proposed 
by Pedroni (2000, 2001). Then, we estimate the following equation: 
 





𝑗=−𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 is the military spending of i-th country, EUMilExp and 
USMilExp are the average military spending of other European countries 
and United States respectively. β1 and β2 are the parameters summarizing 
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the long run panel cointegrated relationships among the variables, while for 
DOLS specification γij and δij are coefficients of current, lead and lag 
differences accounting for potential serial correlation and endogeneity of 
regressors. Tables 4 shows the results. 
 
TABLE 4. Dependent variable: MilExp. 
 FMOLS DOLS 
EUMilExp (logged) -0.303*** -0.213*** 
USMilExp (logged) 0.161*** 0.157*** 
Observations 500 485 
Periods 25 25 
Cross-sections 20 20 
Grouped estimation using differenced data. Individual intercept specification. Long run 
covariances option: Prewhitening with lags=-1 selected by SIC, maxlags=-1, Bartlett kernel, 
Newey-West fixed bandwidth. DOLS estimate: automatic leads and lags specification based 
on SIC criterion. 
 
Results highlight a negative association between military spending among 
the European countries included in the panel, and a positive association 
with US military spending. Results are not sensitive to the estimation 
techniques, since coefficients estimated by FMOLS and DOLS are similar. 
Coefficients are to be interpreted as punctual elasticities: (i) an increase of 
1% in average European military spending translates into a decrease of the 
military spending of the i-th country between 0.2% and 0.3% in the long-
run; (ii) an increase of 1% in US military spending translates into an 
increase of the military spending of the i-th country of 0.16%. The first 
result suggests that within Europe each country has benefited from military 
spending of other countries whereas the latter supports the mechanism 
‘leader/follower’ with respect to US.  
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Reasonably countries can react differently. The table 5 below shows 
cointegration coefficients and their statistical significance for each country 
included in the panel. Some of them are worth noting: (i) not surprisingly 
UK appears to be a follower of US superpower. The long-run elasticity is 0.6; 
(ii) former eastern countries (Hungary and Romania) exhibit a high and 
positive association with US military spending. This perhaps also depends 
on former USSR influence; (iii) most European countries are followers of 
US. Only Ireland, Sweden and Turkey appear to free ride on US; (iv) most 
European countries react negatively to an increase of average spending of 
other European countries. Only Finland, Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg 
do exhibit a positive coefficient. 
 
TABLE 5. Coefficients for each country 
 FMOLS DOLS 
 EUMilExp USMilExp EUMilExp USMilExp 
Belgium -1.321*** 0.445*** -1.137*** 0.350** 
Denmark -0.010 -0.023 0.032 -0.037 
Finland  0.255* 0.316*** 0.196 0.332*** 
France -0.265*** 0.168*** -0.285*** 0.193*** 
Germany -1.077*** 0.471*** -0.809*** 0.342*** 
Greece 0.237 -0.035 0.669* -0.231 
Hungary -2.668*** 0.830*** -1.666*** 0.563** 
Ireland 0.917*** -0.287** 0.804*** -0.287*** 
Italy 0.014 -0.092 0.103 -0.109 
Luxembourg 1.297*** -0.123 1.175*** 0.039 
Netherlands -0.752*** 0.357*** -0.654*** 0.400*** 
Norway -0.382*** -0.076 -0.467*** -0.070 
Poland 1.469*** 0.183* 1.702*** 0.093 
Portugal 0.276*** 0.112** 0.177** 0.160*** 
Romania -2.943*** 0.777*** -2.728*** 1.067*** 
Spain -0.630*** 0.478*** -0.328 0.380*** 
Sweden -0.438*** -0.193*** -0.429*** -0.153*** 
Switzerland -1.096*** 0.027 -1.143*** 0.100** 









The results highlight a positive interdependence between US and European 
military spending. Our estimates reveal that from the military spending 
perspective, the debate on the leader/follower relationships between United 
States and European countries is no longer uncertain. In fact, most 
European countries do behave as followers in the period 1988-2013. When 
considering coefficients for each country, it appears that the only 
remarkable exception is Turkey. In addition, within Europe the negative 
relationship seems to suggest that countries have exploited some form of 
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